Whoever has the private key can login on the account thus configured. This is why access to the private key is protected by a “passphrase”. Someone who acquires a copy of a private key file (for example, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) still has to know this phrase in order to be able to use it. This additional protection is not, however, impregnable, and if you think that this file has been compromised, it is best to disable that key on the computers in which it has been installed (by removing it from the authorized_keys files) and replacing it with a newly generated key.

The OpenSSL library, as initially provided in Debian Etch, had a serious problem in its random number generator (RNG). Indeed, the Debian maintainer had made a change so that applications using it would no longer generate warnings when analyzed by memory testing tools like valgrind. Unfortunately, this change also meant that the RNG was employing only one source of entropy corresponding to the process number (PID) whose 32,000 possible values do not offer enough randomness.

Specifically, whenever OpenSSL was used to generate a key, it always produced a key within a known set of hundreds of thousands of keys (32,000 multiplied by a small number of key lengths). This affected SSH keys, SSL keys, and X.509 certificates used by numerous applications, such as OpenVPN. A cracker had only to try all of the keys to gain unauthorized access. To reduce the impact of the problem, the SSH daemon was modified to refuse problematic keys that are listed in the openssh-blacklist and openssh-blacklist-extra packages. Additionally, the ssh-vulnkey command allows identification of possibly compromised keys in the system.

A more thorough analysis of this incident brings to light that it is the result of multiple (small) problems, both within the OpenSSL project and with the Debian package maintainer. A widely used library like OpenSSL should — without modifications — not generate warnings when tested by valgrind. Furthermore, the code (especially the parts as sensitive as the RNG) should be better commented to prevent such errors. On Debian's side, the maintainer wanted to validate the modifications with the OpenSSL developers, but simply explained the modifications without providing the corresponding patch to review and failed to mention his role within Debian. Finally, the maintenance choices were sub-optimal: the changes made to the original code were not clearly documented; all the modifications were effectively stored in a Subversion repository, but they ended up all lumped into one single patch during creation of the source package.

It is difficult under such conditions to find the corrective measures to prevent such incidents from recurring. The lesson to be learned here is that every divergence Debian introduces to upstream software must be justified, documented, submitted to the upstream project when possible, and widely publicized. It is from this perspective that the new source package format (“3.0 (quilt)”) and the Debian sources webservice were developed.

The Internet, and most LANs that are connected to it, operate in packet mode and not in connected mode, meaning that a packet issued from one computer to another is going to be stopped at several intermediary routers to find its way to its destination. You can still simulate a connected operation where the stream is encapsulated in normal IP packets. These packets follow their usual route, but the stream is reconstructed unchanged at the destination. We call this a “tunnel”, analogous to a road tunnel in which vehicles drive directly from the entrance (input) to the exit (output) without encountering any intersections, as opposed to a path on the surface that would involve intersections and changing direction.

You can use this opportunity to add encryption to the tunnel: the stream that flows through it is then unrecognizable from the outside, but it is returned in decrypted form at the exit of the tunnel.